# Lesson Plan –Monday Night, July 27th, 2016

### Background information on China and Capitalism

We’ll start with a brief discussion – please jot down your answers to the following:

#### Question #1 - What are the common Cap K impact args for the negative:

(you list them – list at least four)

#### Question #2 – How might US economic engagement with say… North Korea… expand capitalism ?....

(Note: I know that the topic does not include North Korea)

#### Question #3 – How might US economic engagement with China expand capitalism ?....

#### Closing thoughts:

### Lesson plan – explained

Each of you will be asked to write a five minute 2NC-1NR speech extending the Cap K.

One of you will be called upon to give their version of the speech before the group.

After it ends, we will call upon three (or so) of you to give a 90 second cx.

…. So, after you are not selected (which will be the case for most of you), there’s no need to keep prepping the neg.

Instead, put on your Aff hat… flow the selected 2NC… and think of cx question..

Because we are going to potentially give 1ARs, we will pause for a second after the 2N is selected and give you a chance to re-flow the 2AC answers on a clean sheet of paper.

### What follows is the backstory of the debate

The 1AC said:

* Plan Option #2 – in short, a concession on CFIUS without a QPQ
* Relations adv – SCS war and ECS war
* Protectionism adv – both impacts (global econ and global protectionism).

### The 1NC Shell that you are extending

#### BITs ascribe to a liberal economic regime through the recolonialization of the host state---this perpetuates cultural domination in the name of maximizing capital productivity

Vandevelde ‘98

Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Professor of Law @ Thomas Jefferson School of Law, "The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty." The American Journal of International Law 92.4 (1998): 621-41. ProQuest.

As the foregoing suggests, economic liberals espouse an outward-looking philosophy that regards integration into the global economy as the key to economic development!17 They favor the removal of barriers to transfrontier investment flows that inhibit global integration and diminish the production of wealth. Further, liberals contend that the negative effects ascribed to foreign investment are often in fact attributable to flawed host state regulatory efforts and thus the proper response is less, rather than more, regulation.48 Particularly within developing states, economic nationalists, with their emphasis on nation building and economic development, have found common cause with Marxist economists, who advocate a more equal distribution of wealth within the international community.49 These theorists share an inward-looking philosophy” and are generally suspicious of unregulated foreign investment. They support intervention in the economy when necessary to ensure that foreign investment conforms to their political goals of promoting the national independence and economic development of Third World states. Their concern about a liberal foreign investment regime is twofold.“ First, foreign investment may not produce the promised increase in efﬁciency. Dependency theory, for example, asserts that foreign investment fosters underdevelopment rather than economic growth in developing states.52 The essence of the argument is that the subsidiary in the developing state will be operated for the beneﬁt of the parent company and thus will transfer resources from the developing to the developed state rather than in the other direction.53 It is alleged, for example, that foreign investment may reduce both foreign currency reserves54 and employment.55 Even where they accept the liberal economic analysis as essentially correct in theory, critics of liberalism point to extensive market failures in developing states that they believe will prevent an unregulated market from delivering the promised growth.56 The second concern is that, even where the promised productivity materializes, in- creased productivity and economic development are not the same thing.57 Economic development theory, particularly since the 19705, has emphasized that economic develop- ment requires both increased productivity and a more equitable distribution of wealth?8 From this perspective, the real goal is development, not simply increased productivity, and liberalism promises only the latter. The second concern thus focuses on the distribu- tional consequences of foreign investment. These consequences are both internal and external. Foreign investment redistributes wealth and power internally in that not all members of the society will beneﬁt equally or at all and some may be disadvantaged by it?9 The beneﬁts may be most likely to accrue to better educated urban populations60 or to politically dominant ethnic groups,“ which serves only to reinforce or extend existing gaps between the wealthy and the poor.62 Alternatively, the creation of new centers of wealth, power and opportunity may weaken the position of traditional elites.63 Foreign investment redistributes wealth and power externally by transferring control over local assets to persons who are outside the national political system.64 This may be particularly objectionable where the enterprise subject to foreign control is important to the host state’s military defense, cultural identity or other vital interests.65 Indeed, the Marxist critique of foreign investment characterizes it as a recolonialization of the host State.66 The apprehension about foreign control ranges from fears of intervention in the political process to concerns about cultural imperialism.” The critique of liberalism is not limited to developing states. Economic nationalists in developed states may fear inward foreign investment, particularly that from other developed states, for many of the same reasons that economic nationalists in developing states fear it.“ Economic nationalists also may fear outward investment because of con- cerns that it will transfer productive capacity, hence employment, abroad.69 11. THE LIBERAL IDEOLOGY OF THE BITS BITs present themselves as quintessentially liberal documents. The typical BIT cites two goals in its preamble: the creation of favorable conditions for investment by nationals and companies of one party in the territory of the other, and increased prosperity in both states.70 In short, the avowed purpose of a BIT may be distilled into ﬁve words: increased prosperity through foreign investment. The preamble thus afﬁrms the basic liberal doctrine that free movement of capital will yield greater productivity. Further, the history of the BITS indicates that a principal inducement for states to enter into a BIT has been precisely that it afﬁrms liberalism. Although the ﬁrst BIT program was inaugurated in 1959 by Germany,71 BIT negotiations proceeded throughout the 19603 at a largely desultory pace. In the ten years from 1959 through 1968, only seventy-four BITS were concluded, that is, fewer than eight per year worldwide.72 Of these seventy-four, half were concluded by Germany. The pace of negotiations did not noticeably change until the mid—1970s, when ideologi- cal debates concerning the standard of compensation for expropriation that was required by customary international law emerged as the central issue in discussions of international investment law.” Developed states proposed the negotiation of BITS providing for prompt, adequate and effective compensation for expropriation as an antidote to eco- nomic nationalist assertions that expropriated investors were entitled to no more than national treatment and Marxist claims that no compensation at all was owed.“ Thus, the BITS acquired a distinct ideological purpose. Indeed, the United States was unwilling to negotiate any BIT that did not embrace the prompt, adequate and effective standard, despite the fact that the treaty might have offered real protection in other respects for foreign investors, because any such protection would have been insufﬁcient to justify the ideological consequences of agreeing to a weaker compensation standard.” In direct response to United Nations General Assembly debates on the measure of compensation, the United States launched its BIT program in 1977.76 Several other developed states also inaugurated their programs in the 19705.77 France concluded its ﬁrst BIT in 1972,78 the United Kingdom in 1975,79 Austria in 1976,80 andjapan in 1977.“ During the ten years from 1977 to 1986, some 153 BITS were negotiated, meaning that the pace of negotiations in the decade starting in the mid-19705 was about double that of the ﬁrst decade of the program. The pace of negotiations quickened a second time in the early 19903, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transformation of the Central and East European economies from socialism to free markets.82 Conclusion of a BIT represented a relatively easy way for these states to demonstrate their renunciation of Marxist economics and their com- mitment to a liberal economic regime. For example, some 196 BITS were signed in 1996 alone,83 an astonishing contrast to the fewer than 8 per year signed in the 19605.84 BITS have therefore been concluded in many cases because they symbolize a commit- ment to economic liberalism. The sincerity of that commitment, however, can be mea- sured by examining the provisions of the BIT.

#### Economic rationality prioritizes short term profit over the well-being of environment and human life-makes extinction inevitable

Nhanenge ‘7

(Jytte, South Africa development studies masters, “Ecofeminsm: Towards Integrating The Concerns Of Women, Poor People And Nature Into Development”, February, <http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/570/dissertation.pdf?sequence=1>)

Generation of wealth was an important part of the Scientific Revolution and its modern society. The scientific discipline of economics therefore became a significant means for wealth creation. However, since it is founded on similar dualised premises as science, also economics became a system of domination and exploitation of women, Others and nature. The following discussion is intended to show that. The way in which economics, with its priority on masculine forces, becomes dominant relates to web-like, inter-connected and complex processes, which are not always clearly perceived. The below discussions try to show how the dualised priority of the individual over society, reason over emotion, self-interest over community-interest, competition over cooperation, and more pairs, **generate** **domination that leads to the four crises of violence and war, poverty, human oppression and environmental degradation**. The aim in sum is to show how the current perspective of economics is destroying society (women and Others) and nature. The following discussion is consequently a critique of economics. It is meant to highlight some elements that make economics a dominant ideology, rather than a system of knowledge. It adopts a feministic view and it is therefore seen from the side of women, poor people and nature. The critique is extensive, but not exhaustive. It is extensive because economics is the single most important tool used by mainstream institutions for development in the South. Thus if we want to understand why development does not alleviate poverty, then we first need to comprehend why its main instrument, economics, cannot alleviate poverty. A critical analysis of economics and its influence in development is therefore important as an introduction to next chapter, which discusses ecofeminism and development. However, the critique is not exhaustive because it focuses only on the dualised elements in economics. It is highly likely that there are many more critical issues in economics, which should be analyzed in addition to the below mentioned. However, it would exceed this scope. Each of the following 10 sections discusses a specific issue in economics that relates to its dualised nature. Thus, each can as such be read on its own. However, all sections are systemically interconnected. Therefore each re-enforces the others and integrated, they are meant to show the web of masculine forces that make economics dominant towards women, Others and nature. The first three sections intend to show that economics sees itself as a neutral, objective, quantitative and universal science, which does not need to be integrated in social and natural reality. **The outcome of this is, however, that economics cannot value social and environmental needs**. Hence, a few individuals become very rich from capitalising on free social and natural resources, while the health of the public and the environment is degraded. It also is shown that the exaggerated focus on monetary wealth does not increase human happiness. It rather leads to a deteriorating quality of life. **Thus, the false belief in eternal economic growth may eventually destroy life on planet Earth**. The next section shows that economics is based on dualism, with a focus solely on yang forces. This has serious consequences for all yin issues: For example, the priority on individualism over community may in its extreme form lead to self-destruction. **Similarly, the priority on rationality while excluding human emotions may end in greed, domination, poverty, violence and war**. The next section is important as a means to understanding "rational" economics. Its aim is to clarify the psychological meaning of money. In reality, reason and emotion are interrelated parts of the human mind; they cannot be separated. Thus, economic "rationality" and its focus on eternal wealth generation are based on personal emotions like fears and inadequacies, rather than reason. The false belief in dualism means that human beings are lying to themselves, which results in disturbed minds, stupid actions with disastrous consequences. **The focus on masculine forces is consequently psychologically unhealthy; it leads to domination of society and nature, and will eventually destroy the world**. The following three sections are intending to show that the new global capitalism is doing just that. First, the neo-liberal economical scheme is presented. Secondly, its application in the Third World as Structural Adjustment Programmes and as the New Economic Partnership for African Development is critiqued. Thirdly, the extreme application of the disturbed "rational" human mind, manifested in the form of an institutional psychopath "the corporation", is discussed. After concluding that economics is a patriarchal system of domination, alternative economic models, which can support women, Others and nature, are presented.

#### The alternative is to reject the affirmative in order to abandon belief in capitalism

Johnston ‘4

(Adrian, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of New Mexico, Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society, Volume 9/Issue 3)

Perhaps the absence of a detailed practical roadmap in Žižek’s political writings isn’t a major shortcoming. Maybe, at least for the time being, the most important task is simply the negativity of the critical struggle, the effort to cure an intellectual constipation resulting from capitalist ideology and thereby truly to open up the space for imagining authentic alternatives to the prevailing state of the situation. Another definition of materialism offered by Žižek is that it amounts to accepting the internal inherence of what fantasmatically appears as an external deadlock or hindrance 127 (with fantasy itself being defined as the false externalization of something within the subject, namely, the illusory projection of an inner obstacle 128). From this perspective, seeing through ideological fantasies by learning how to think again outside the confines of current restrictions has, in and of itself, the potential to operate as a form of real revolutionary practice (rather than remaining just an instance of negative/critical intellectual reflection). Why is this the case? Recalling the earlier analysis of commodity fetishism, the social efficacy of money as the universal medium of exchange (and the entire political economy grounded upon it) ultimately relies upon nothing 93 more than a kind of “magic,” that is, the belief in money’s social efficacy by those using it in the processes of exchange. Since the value of currency is, at bottom, reducible to the belief that it has the value attributed to it (and that everyone believes that everyone else believes this as well), derailing capitalism by destroying its essential financial substance is, in a certain respect, as easy as dissolving the mere belief in this substance’s powers. The “external” obstacle of the capitalist system exists exclusively on the condition that subjects, whether consciously or unconsciously, “internally” believe in it—capitalism’s life-blood, money, is simply a fetishistic crystallization of a belief in others’ belief in the socioperformative force emanating from this same material.

### The 2AC answers

#### ( ) Perm – plan and all non-competitive parts of their alt

#### ( ) The Alt is insufficient and not workable. Capitalism exists outside of the US and China. There’s no apparatus to “abandon belief in capitalism”.

#### ( ) Alt fails worse than Aff ever could. Uniquely boosts social injustice.

Barnett ‘10

Clive Barnett – Faculty of Social Sciences and Reader in Human Geography at The Open University.

From Chapter Twelve – “PUBLICS AND MARKETS: What’s wrong with Neoliberalism?” – From the book: The Handbook of Social Geography, edited by Susan Smith, Sallie Marston, Rachel Pain, and John Paul Jones III. London and New York: Sage. Available via http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/emergentpublics/publications/barnett\_publicsandmarkets.pdf

In accepting the same simplistic opposition between individual freedom and social justice presented by Hayek, but simply reversing the evaluation of the two terms, critics of neoliberalism end up presenting highly moralistic forms of analysis of contemporary political processes. In resisting the idealization of the market as the embodiment of public virtue, they end up embracing an equally idealized view of the forum as the alternative figure of collective life (see Elster 1986). For example, while Harvey insists that neoliberalism is a process driven by the aim of restoring class power, he ends his analysis by arguing that it is the anti-democratic character of neoliberalism that should be the focal point of opposition (Harvey 2005, 205-206). But it is far from clear whether the theories of neoliberalism and neoliberalization developed by political economists, sometimes with the help of governmentality studies, can contribute to reconstructing a theory and practice of radical democratic justice. In Harvey’s analysis, the withdrawal of the state is taken for granted, and leads to the destruction of previous solidarities, unleashing pathologies of anomie, anti-social behaviour and criminality (ibid, 81). In turn, the vacuum created by the withdrawal of the state leads to social solidarities being reconstructed around other axes, of religion and morality, associationism, and nationalism. What has been described as the rise of the “movement society”, expressed in the proliferation of contentious politics of rights-based struggles and identity politics, Harvey sees as one aspect of a spread of corrosive social forms triggered by the rolling-back of states. In the wake of this rolling-back “[e]verything from gangs and criminal cartels, narco-trafficking networks, mini-mafias and favela bosses, through community, grassroots and non-governmental organizations, to secular cults and religious sects proliferate” (ibid, 171). These are alternative social forms “that fill the void left behind as state, powers, political parties and other institutional forms are actively dismantled or simply wither away as centres of collective endeavour and of social bonding” (ibid.). What’s really wrong with neoliberalism, for critics who have constructed it as a coherent object of analysis, is the unleashing of destructive pathologies through the combined withdrawal of the state and the unfettered growth of market exchange. ‘Individual freedom’ is presented as a medium of uninhibited hedonism, which if given too much free reign undermines the ascetic virtues of self-denial upon which struggles for ‘social justice’ are supposed to depend. Underwritten by simplistic moral denunciations of ‘the market’, these theories cover over a series of analytic, explanatory, and normative questions. In the case of both the Marxist narrative of neoliberalization, and the Foucauldian analysis of neoliberal governmentality, it remains unclear whether either tradition can provide adequate resources for thinking about the practical problems of democracy, rights and social justice. This is not helped by the systematic denigration in both lines of thought of ‘liberalism’, a catch-all term used with little discrimination. There is a tendency to present neoliberalism as the natural end-point or rolling-out of a longer tradition of liberal thought – an argument only sustainable through the implicit invocation of some notion of a liberal ‘episteme’ covering all varieties and providing a core of meaning. One of the lessons drawn by diverse strands of radical political theory from the experience of twentieth-century history is that struggles for social justice can create new forms of domination and inequality. It is this that leads to a grudging appreciation of liberalism as a potential source for insight into the politics of pluralistic associational life. The cost of the careless disregard for ‘actually existing liberalisms’ is to remain blind to the diverse strands of egalitarian thought about the relationships between democracy, rights and social justice that one finds in, for example: post-Rawslian political philosophy; post-Habermasian theories of democracy, including their feminist variants; various postcolonial liberalisms; the flowering of agonistic liberalisms and theories of radical democracy; and the revival of republican theories of democracy, freedom, and justice. No doubt theorists of neoliberalism would see all this as hopelessly trapped within the ‘neoliberal frame’ of individualism, although if one takes this argument to its logical conclusion, even Marx’s critique of capitalist exploitation, dependent as it is on an ideal of self-ownership, is nothing more than a variation on Lockean individual rights.

#### Zero link – empirics prove BIT’s don’t expand global capital. *Neg* epistemology’s biased.

Chilton ‘15

Adam Chilton – Faculty and Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Chicago. Adam received a BA and MA in Political Science from Yale University. Adam then went to Harvard University and earned a JD as well as a PhD in Political Science. “The Politics of the United States' Bilateral Investment Treaty Program" (Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics No. 722, 2015). http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2409&context=law\_and\_economics

Despite this slow start, the United States has now signed BITs with 47 countries. All U.S. BITs are based on a model treaty and, although the specific provisions of the model have evolved over the years, the core elements of these agreements have been the same (Akhtar and Weiss 2013, 8). First, agreements guarantee that investments made by individuals and corporations from the other country will be treated fairly and equitably. Second, the agreements limit expropriation of investment, and provide for compensation when expropriation does take place. Third, the agreements provide investors the right to transfer their property out of the foreign state freely. Fourth, the agreements place restrictions on trade-distorting performance requirements—like local content requirements or export quotas. Fifth, if the terms of the BIT have been violated and the national courts of the foreign country do not provide redress, the agreements authorize investors to force the foreign state to participate in binding arbitration. Taken together, these five provisions give assurances to capital exporters that investments made in the market of a treaty partner will be provided with legal protection. Perhaps unsurprisingly, as the number of BITs that the United States is party to has proliferated, so has scholarship on these agreements (Shaffer and Ginsburg 2012. 35-38). Although this scholarship has not included a single empirical study evaluating the motivations of the U.S. BITs program, scholars have consistently argued that the United States signed BITs because it hoped to influence the development of international investment law and to protect American investments abroad (Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006, 815-16; Vandevelde 2005, 171; Lang 1998, 457; Vandevelde 1998a, 201-2; Vandevelde 1988,1-2; Gann 1985, 374; Sachs 1984, 195). Given this belief, scholars have evaluated U.S. BITs almost entirely based on their ability to protect and promote investment. Although it is certainly at least partially true that the United States was concerned with the development of international investment law and hoped that these treaties would help American investors, there are several reasons to doubt that this investment-centric view of the U.S. BITs program is the fully story. First, U.S. BIT negotiators have warned treaty partners that they should not expect a wave of new investments as a consequence of these agreements (Alvarez 2010, 621 n.69; Vandevelde 1998a, 212), which is evidence that U.S. officials themselves are aware that the economic impact of these agreements is likely quite limited. Second, if the United States were motivated by a desire to promote the development of international investment law and to protect American investors, it would have entered into a BIT with any country that would agree to its terms. This, however, was not the case (Vandevelde 1993, 169-70). Third, there is scant evidence of any pressure from American interest groups on the United States to ratify the BITs that it has signed, suggesting that U.S. investors are not eager to avail themselves of any new opportunities or protections that BITs may provide. Fourth, evidence suggests that U.S. BITs do not have a positive impact on investment flows between the United States and partner countries (Peinhardt and Allee 2012; Yackee 2008). Fifth, there is reason to believe that BITs do not influence companies' investment decisions (Yackee 2010), which calls into question whether BITs are negotiated to provide increased protections for capital exporters. Given the limited interest in—and evidence of—the investment benefits of BITs, it is worth reconsidering why the United States actively pursued a BITs program for three decades. I argue that the dominant narrative misses the mark: the United States did not primarily form BITs to promote and protect investments abroad, but instead to improve relationships with politically important developing countries. BITs have been used in this way because they have several features that make them an appealing foreign policy tool: they do not necessitate outlaying funds, require the United States to make only "redundant" obligations, are easy to sell politically, and take minimal effort to negotiate given their standardized nature. Having a BIT with the United States is attractive politically to the governments of many developing countries as well. Potential BIT partners are frequently eager to sign these treaties, even though they are warned that the agreements likely will not lead to new investments, because the treaty provides domestic political benefits to the country's government. Since international relations are a repeated game, a new treaty partner would thus likely reciprocate by extending political benefits to the United States in order to receive favorable treatment again in the future. The implication of this theory is that investment considerations will not explain which countries the United States has chosen to sign BITs with, and that looking solely at the investment consequences of the treaties ignores many of their potential benefits. Instead, it is my contention that political considerations will better explain which countries the United States has chosen to sign BITs with, and that BITs should be evaluated at least in part based on whether they have generated political dividends.

#### ( ) perm – do the aff – advance investment but without extending the most violent modes of capitalism.

#### ( ) Prefer policy framework. Regress – endless items could become nexus questions. Other options unfairly whisk away the 1AC and don’t teach pragmatic change – which is educationally valuable for both sides’ impact claims.

#### Capitalism innovation check their green impact and “try or die” args.

Harte and Harte 12

John, Professor of Ecosystem Sciences at the University of California, Berkeley and Mary Ellen, biologist and columnist who writes on climate change and population, “Alarmism Is Justified”, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Sep/Oct 2012, Vol. 91, Issue 5

The Limits to Growth predicted catastrophe: humanity would deplete natural resources and pollute itself to death. Its solution was less economic growth, more recycling, and organic farming. My essay documented how the book's predictions were wildly off, mainly because its authors ignored how innovation would help people overcome environmental challenges. Because the book's goal was so dramatic -- averting the end of the world -- its recommendation was for society to simultaneously do everything in its power to forestall that outcome. Today, much of the environmental movement continues to evince such alarmism and, consequently, is unable to prioritize. Developed countries focus as much on recycling, which achieves precious little at a high cost, as they do on attaining the much larger benefits from tackling air pollution, a massive, if declining, threat. Meanwhile, some environmentalists' demands are simply counterproductive. Avoiding pesticides, for example, means farming more land less efficiently, which leads to higher prices, more hunger, more disease (because of a lower intake of fruits and vegetables), and less biodiversity. My essay argued that although the The Limits to Growth's analysis has been proved wrong, much of its doomsaying and policy advice still pervades the environmental debate 40 years later. These four critiques, instead of refuting my argument, in fact vindicate it. First, only Dennis Meadows really tries to defend The Limits to Growth's predictions of collapse, and he does so with little conviction. Second, at least some of the responses accept in principle that society needs to prioritize among its different environmental goals and that economic growth will make achieving them easier -- in Frances Beinecke's words, "prosperity often leads to greater environmental protection." Third, all four of the critiques of my essay rely on the language of doom to motivate action, which, to the detriment of the environment, convinces society that it must pursue all its environmental goals at once, regardless of the costs and benefits. Finally, by focusing on the threats of economic growth to the environment, the authors generally neglect that growth has lifted billions of people out of grinding poverty and that others may remain poor because of the developed world's environmental concerns, real or imagined. WRONG AGAIN Defending The Limits to Growth, Meadows curiously complains that I address only the original book, which is "long out of print." He then posits that my case rests on one table from that book, on resource depletion, which he says I misrepresent. That is incorrect on several counts. First, it is patently false to claim, as Meadows does by way of a quotation from Matthew Simmons, that "nowhere in the book was there any mention about running out of anything by 2000." (Jørgen Randers makes a similar point.) The Limits to Growth quoted approvingly the first annual report by the U.S. government's Council on Environmental Quality, in 1970: "It would appear at present that the quantities of platinum, gold, zinc and lead are not sufficient to meet demands. At the present rate of expansion … silver, tin and uranium may be in short supply even at higher prices by the turn of the century." Meadows' own table publicized "the number of years known global reserves will last at current global consumption," showing that gold, lead, mercury, silver, tin, and zinc would not last to the year 2000. The instances go on. According to the book's model, the main driver of the global system's so-called collapse would be the depletion of resources, and averting that outcome was the book's widely publicized rallying cry. So focusing on that aspect of the book can hardly be called a misrepresentation. What is more, claiming that this is my only critique ignores that I also showed how the book got pollution wrong and how its analysis of collapse simply did not follow. Meadows and Randers both claim that in their model, pollution consisted of long-lived toxics, not air pollution. In fact, they were much more vague on this question in 1972. In the best case for their predictions of deadly pollution, they meant air pollution, which today accounts for about 62 percent of all environmental deaths, according to the World Bank and the World Health Organization. But if they indeed meant long-lived toxics, their prediction that "pollution rises very rapidly, causing an immediate increase in the death rate" has been clearly disproven by the declining global death rate and the massive reductions in persistent pollutants. John Harte and Mary Ellen Harte put forth a similarly weak defense of The Limits to Growth, as they do not challenge my data. They quote an article by the ecologists Charles Hall and John Day to say that The Limits to Growth's results were "almost exactly on course some 35 years later in 2008." This is simply wrong when it comes to resource levels, as the data in my original article shows, and indeed the cited article contains not a single reference for its claims about oil and copper resource reductions. Harte and Harte further argue that the increase in the cost of resources during the last ten years is evidence of "the limitations on the human enterprise." Meadows claims that this uptick may "herald a permanent shift in the trend." Yet neither carries through the argument, because the empirical data from the past 150 years overwhelmingly undermine it. The reason is that a temporary increase in the scarcity of a resource causes its price to rise, which in turn encourages more exploration, substitution, and innovation across the entire chain of production, thereby negating any increase in scarcity. Harte and Harte demonstrate the unpleasant arrogance that accompanies the true faith, claiming that I "deny" knowledge, promote "scientific misconceptions," and display "scientific ignorance." They take particular issue with my assertion that DDT is a cheap solution to malaria, stating that I overlooked the issue of biological resistance. In fact, all malarial treatments face this problem, but DDT less so than the others. Whereas many malarial treatments, such as dieldrin, work only by killing insects, DDT also repels and irritates them. Dieldrin strongly selects for resistance, whereas DDT works in three ways and even repels 60 percent of DDT-resistant mosquitoes. FALSE ALARM All four critiques contain grand dollops of doom. Beinecke invokes "alarming" environmental problems from overfishing to the destruction of the rain forests and global warming. These are real issues, but they, too, deserve practical thinking and careful prioritization. Fish and rain forests, like other resources subject to political control, tend to be overused. By contrast, when resources are controlled by individuals and private groups, their owners are forced to weigh long-term sustainability. Indeed, Beinecke's response reflects the most unfortunate legacy of The Limits to Growth: because of its persistent belief that the planet is in crisis, the environmental movement suggests tackling all environmental problems at once. This is impossible, of course, so society ends up focusing mainly on what catches the public's attention. Beinecke acknowledges that campaigns to enact environmental policy "emerged from what people saw with their own eyes: raw sewage in the Great Lakes, smog so thick that it obscured the George Washington Bridge, oil despoiling Santa Barbara's pristine beaches." Yet the smog killed more than 300,000 Americans annually, whereas the effects of the oil spills, although serious, were of a much lower order of magnitude. She claims that the U.S. Clean Air Act somehow contradicts my argument, when I in fact emphasized that society should have focused much more on cleaner air. Today, roughly 135,000 Americans still die from outdoor air pollution each year, and two million people, mostly in the developing world, die from indoor air pollution. Instead of focusing on the many negligible environmental problems that catch the public's attention, as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency did when it focused so heavily on pesticides in the 1970s and 1980s, government should tackle the most important environmental problems, air quality chief among them. Beinecke misses this tradeoff entirely. Harte and Harte demonstrate a similar lack of proportion and priority. In response to my claim that a slightly larger portion of the world's arable land -- roughly five percent -- will need to be tapped in order to feed humanity, they offer an unsubstantiated fear that such an expansion would undermine "giant planetary ecosystems." Yet when they fret about pesticides, they seem impervious to the fact that eschewing them would require society to increase the acreage of land it farms by more than ten times that amount. COOL DOWN If The Limits to Growth erred in some of its quantitative projections, then perhaps, as Harte and Harte put it, its "qualitative insights [are] still valid today." Randers cites global warming as the new reason the book was right. Discussing his predictions for high carbon dioxide emissions, Randers writes, "This future is unpleasantly similar to the 'persistent pollution scenario' from The Limits to Growth." But the comparison is unfounded and leads to poor judgment. In The Limits to Growth's, original formulation, pollution led to civilizational decline and death. Although many environmentalists discuss global warming in similarly cataclysmic terms, the scenarios from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change project instead a gradually worsening drag on development. Standard analyses show a reduction of zero to five percent of global GDP by 2100, in a world where the average person in the developing world will be 23 times as rich as he or she is today. Moreover, although the responses to my essay invoke global warming as a new rallying cry for environmental activism, they fail to suggest specific actions to avert it. Harte and Harte claim that "the scientific community knows how to transition to renewable clean energy." Sure, developed countries have the technical know-how to adopt clean energy, but they have not done so because it would still be phenomenally expensive. Policies aimed at stopping climate change have failed for the last two decades because much of the environmental movement, clutching dearly to The Limits to Growth's alarmism and confident sense of purpose, has refused to weigh the costs and benefits and has demanded that countries immediately abandon all polluting sources of energy. Many economists, including the 27 climate economists involved in the 2009 Copenhagen Consensus on Climate conference, have pointed out smarter ways forward. The best means of tackling global warming would be to make substantial investments in green energy research and development, in order to find a way to produce clean energy at a lower cost than fossil fuels. As one of the leading advocates of this approach, I cannot comprehend how Harte and Harte could claim that I do not support clean-energy innovation. Unfortunately, the world will be hard-pressed to focus on smarter environmental policies until it has expunged the dreadful doom of The Limits to Growth. And unless the environmental movement can overcome its fear of economic growth, it will also too easily forget the plight of the billions of poor people who require, above all, **more and faster growth**.

#### ( ) Impact as policy disad is silly – their “try-or-die” arg is empirically false and the perm solves it anyway. Prefer Aff’s try or die claims – specific scenarios and more workable alt.